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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






HAKIM BOND,  




VISIONQUEST; VISIONQUEST NATIONAL DIRECTOR;  
MAJOR SMITH, UNIT DIRECTOR, COUNSELOR AND MEDICAL STAFF;  
MR. MCGLAUGHLIN, ALL OF VISIONQUEST; THE CLARION HOSPITAL; THE 
TREATMENT TEAM; DOCTOR PETER MEYER; THE CHILDRENS HOSPITAL OF 
PHILADELPHIA; THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; THE PHILADELPHIA  
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES DIRECTOR; THE DIRECTOR OF  
THE YOUTH STUDY CENTER;  THE PHYSICIAN AND MEDICAL STAFF,  
TO INCLUDE NURSES AND OTHER THERAPIST OR THE TREATMENT TEAM;  
THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNITY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH; AMANDA LATSHAW;  
SABRINA BACKSTONE, OF COMMUNITY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH;  
THE DIRECTOR; DR. JEROME VANCE; MR. DAVE ASAY, THERAPIST;  
MR. DAVE GUYMAN, SUPERVISING THERAPIST; DR. THOMAS;  
THE BENCHMARK BEHAVIORAL HEALTHSYSTEMS 
____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-04527) 
District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: February 7, 2011) 







BARRY, Circuit Judge 
Hakim Bond appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his complaint 
as time-barred and vacating a prior order to appoint counsel.  For the reasons stated 
below, we will affirm.        
I.Background 
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly recite 
the facts.  Bond brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various state-law 
causes of action, alleging, among other things, that he was misdiagnosed, subjected to 
racism, and in many other ways severely mistreated while he was a minor under state 
custody and supervision.  Bond named as defendants a host of state agencies, private 
institutions, and individuals.  To name just a few, the defendants included VisionQuest 
National, Ltd. (“VisionQuest”), which Bond described as a “national corporate [juvenile] 
delinquent facility [which] utilizes extreme boot camp measures, and [which] imposes 
Indian culture and practices on youth.”  App. at 23 ¶ 5; Clarion Hospital, where Bond 
was treated; and the City of Philadelphia.      
In March 2006, Bond, along with his father, Reginald Carter, filed a pro se complaint in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging essentially the same facts as  
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alleged here.  On October 23, 2006, Bond filed a motion to withdraw the complaint, 
noting that Pennsylvania‟s statute of limitations permitted him to file a civil action until 
September 14, 2008, two years after his eighteenth birthday, and that Carter hoped to 
“gather the proper legal help” to pursue the case.  Id. at 187.  The complaint was 
dismissed without prejudice on January 16, 2007.   
On September 17, 2008, Bond commenced the present action by filing a motion to 
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  The motion was dated September 12, 2008, and date-
stamped received by the District Court on September 17, 2008.  Bond listed his address 
as what appears to be a private residence in Philadelphia.  Bond‟s proposed complaint 
was attached to the IFP motion, and was dated September 12, 2008.  The complaint also 
listed the same residential address in Philadelphia and stated, in the first line, that Bond 
“is a resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.”  App. at 22.  Significantly, attached as an 
exhibit to the complaint was a letter from Carter to Bond‟s former state-appointed 
attorneys dated September 16, 2008, and marked in handwriting, “Hand delivered 
9/17/08.”  Id. at 36.  On September 25, 2008, the Court granted Bond‟s IFP motion and 
ordered the complaint to be filed.   
On December 12, 2008, Bond filed a motion for appointment of counsel, stating that 
“Plaintiff is currently incarcerated and finds it nearly impossible and quite difficult to 
work with his father . . . in pursuing this matter.”  Id. at 70.  Clarion Hospital opposed 
Bond‟s motion, arguing that the complaint was untimely because it was filed after the  
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two-year statute of limitations for such actions under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.  Clarion 
Hospital also asked the Court to dismiss the case in its entirety due to the statute of  
limitations barrier.  Bond filed a reply to Clarion Hospital‟s motion, stating that “plaintiff 
believes that his being late in this filing by a couple of days is forgivable, and ask [sic] 
that the court makes an exception in this matter based on the need for fairness, justice, 
and the fact that he and his father sought to bring this matter before the court, not being 
ab[]le to obtain counsel . . . .”  Id. at 100.   
On February 6, 2009, the District Court granted Bond‟s motion for appointment of 
counsel by referring the matter to the Prisoner Civil Rights Panel for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, which would seek counsel for Bond.  The Court also placed Bond‟s case 
on the “suspense” list.  VisionQuest filed a motion to dismiss on February 9, 2009, 
claiming that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, which ran on September 
14, 2008, Bond‟s twentieth birthday.  The City of Philadelphia filed a similar motion on 
March 18, 2009. 
On August 7, 2009, the District Court removed the case from suspense, vacated its prior 
order granting Bond‟s motion for appointment of counsel, granted VisionQuest‟s and the 
City of Philadelphia‟s motions to dismiss, dismissed all remaining motions as moot, and 
dismissed Bond‟s claims against all defendants with prejudice.  The Court stated that 
Bond‟s complaint, filed September 17, 2008, was time-barred because the statute of 
limitations ran on September 14, 2008.  Id. at 6.  It stated that Bond “was not a  
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prisoner at the time when he filed his Complaint, thus the „prisoner mailbox rule‟ does 
not apply.”  Id.  The Court noted that sometime after it referred the case to the Prisoner 
Civil Rights Panel, the Panel “informed the Court that Plaintiff was no longer 
incarcerated.”  Id.  Accordingly, Bond‟s case was ineligible for submission to the Panel 
for referral to an attorney.   
On December 31, 2009, we granted Bond‟s motion for appointment of appellate 
counsel, and directed appointed counsel to address: (1) whether the District Court 
adequately addressed the factors set forth in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-58 (3d Cir. 
1993), in denying Bond‟s motion for appointment of counsel; (2) whether Bond was 
incarcerated when he filed his complaint; and (3) whether the Court erred in dismissing 
Bond‟s complaint without considering whether there was any basis for tolling.  We also 
directed counsel to include documents, including relevant mailing envelopes, 
demonstrating when the Court received the complaint.  Appellees have submitted as part 
of the record a copy of a mailing envelope addressed to the Clerk of Court with a return 
address for Bond, care of his father, listing the same residential Philadelphia address that 
appeared on Bond‟s other documents.  The envelope contains no postmark or postage, 
which suggests that a third person, possibly Bond‟s father, hand-delivered the IFP motion 
and complaint to the Court.        
 
II.Discussion1 
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We exercise de novo review over a district court‟s grant of a motion to dismiss.  
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  We “must accept the 
truth of all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non-movant.”  Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  We review a district court‟s decision declining to appoint counsel for abuse 
of discretion.  Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002).         
Bond argues that that he was incarcerated when the IFP motion and complaint 
were filed and, thus, that he was entitled to the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule and 
his September 17, 2008 filing was not time-barred.  Bond‟s § 1983 and supplemental 
state-law claims are governed by Pennsylvania‟s two-year statute of limitations for 
personal injury claims.  See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000); 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5524.  Because Bond was a minor during the events described in his 
complaint, Pennsylvania‟s tolling statute permitted his complaint to be filed for two years 
after his eighteenth birthday, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b), in his case, until September 
14, 2008.  Because September 14, 2008 fell on a Sunday, Bond had until Monday, 
                                                                                                                                                             
1  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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September 15, 2008 to file his complaint.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(3).2   
The Supreme Court first articulated the prisoner mailbox rule in Houston v. Lack, 
487 U.S. 266 (1988), where it found that a notice of appeal was timely filed at the time 
that it was delivered to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.  Id. at 276.  
Other circuits, as well as district courts within the Third Circuit, have extended this rule 
to pro se prisoner complaints.  See, e.g., Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 
2002); Smith v. Carroll, 602 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 n.7 (D. Del. 2009).  So, too, will we for 
purposes of this appeal.        
Bond argues that he was imprisoned when he filed his complaint.  The District 
Court, however, was unaware of this when it dismissed the complaint.  In response to our 
December 31, 2009 Order directing Bond‟s attorney to address whether Bond was 
incarcerated at the time he filed his complaint, Bond filed a two-page document which 
appears to show that he was released on bail from the Curran-Fromhold Correctional 
Facility (“CFCF”) in Philadelphia on February 3, 2008, and re-admitted on February 8, 
2008.  He also points to his personal information on the Court‟s civil docket sheet, which 
lists his address as the Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center (“PICC”) and shows 
his prisoner number.  Neither of these documents, however, establishes that Bond was 
                                                 
2   Certain appellees contend that Rule 6(a)(3) is not relevant to prisoners seeking to apply 
the prisoner mailbox rule, but they concede, for purposes of this appeal, that Bond had 
until September 15, 2008 to file his complaint.   
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imprisoned at the time he filed his complaint.  The two-page document showing his 
intake at CFCF only establishes that he was imprisoned on February 8, 2008, not at the 
time he filed the complaint in September 2008.  Further, the address listed on the docket 
sheet at the time of appeal only reflects his address at that time; it was not necessarily his 
address in September 2008. 
But even assuming that Bond was incarcerated in September 2008, he is not 
entitled to the prisoner mailbox rule because there was no way for the District Court to 
have known that Bond was imprisoned.  The addresses listed on Bond‟s complaint, his 
IFP motion, and the mailing envelope containing the motion and complaint all listed what 
appears to be a residential address.  Nothing in the complaint or motion suggested that he 
was imprisoned at the time of filing.   
Most damaging to Bond‟s argument is the letter attached to his complaint that was 
dated September 16, 2008, and marked “hand delivered” on September 17, 2008.  If these 
dates are accurate, and there is no plausible reason to believe otherwise, then for Bond‟s 
complaint to have been mailed from prison, the complaint could not have been placed 
into the custody of prison officials for delivery to the District Court until, at the earliest, 
September 17, 2008.  It is unlikely that this is the case, since the complaint was filed on 
that date.  The more likely scenario, which is supported by the fact that the envelope 
containing the complaint had no date stamp or postage, is that Bond gave the complaint 
to a third party, possibly his father, to hand deliver to the clerk‟s office.  In that case, he is 
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not entitled to the prisoner mailbox rule.  See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 567-
68 (3d Cir. 1999) (habeas motion filed by prisoner‟s attorney not entitled to prisoner 
mailbox rule); Pearson v. Vaugh, 984 F. Supp. 315, 316-17 (E.D. Pa. 1997).   
Bond argues the applicability of a “presumption” that since his complaint is dated 
September 12, 2008, it was delivered to prison authorities prior to September 15, 2008, 
and, thus, complies with the prison mailbox rule.  He cites to United States v. Rinaldi, 
where we deemed a prisoner‟s notice of appeal as timely based on the date listed on the 
notice of appeal, rather than the docketed date.  447 F.3d 192, 194 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Bond‟s argument, however, ignores the Supreme Court‟s observation in Houston that 
adopting a prisoner mailbox rule would not lead to disputes over the timing of a 
prisoner‟s filing because “prison authorities . . . have well-developed procedures for 
recording the date and time at which they receive papers for mailing and . . . can readily 
dispute a prisoner‟s assertions that he delivered the paper on a different date.”  487 U.S. 
at 275.  Here, Bond provides no evidence—and does not even directly state—that he 
provided the complaint to prison authorities to mail to the District Court.3     
                                                 
3  We reject Bond‟s additional argument that the District Court erred by dismissing his 
complaint as untimely without notice to him and without an opportunity to file a 
response.  First, Bond did respond to Clarion Hospital‟s motion stating that Bond‟s 
claims were time-barred, and never mentioned that he was imprisoned at the time he filed 
the complaint.  Second, and more importantly, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 
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We also reject Bond‟s argument that the District Court erred in vacating its order 
appointing him counsel because it relied on an erroneous finding of fact as to his 
imprisonment status and because it failed to consider the factors set forth in Tabron.  
Even assuming that the Court relied on incorrect information, Bond cannot satisfy the test 
for appointment of counsel.  Tabron requires a district court to first determine whether a 
case has some merit.  Here, even though the Court did not mention Tabron or explicitly 
apply its factors, it implicitly found that because Bond‟s complaint was time-barred, he 
could not overcome that important threshold requirement.  See, e.g., Gallicchio v. 
Bonner, No. 10-405 (SRC)(MAS), 2010 WL 2348705, at *1-2 (D.N.J. June 9, 2010) 
(denying appointment of pro bono counsel because petitioner‟s claims were time-barred).  
Because the complaint was time-barred, error in relying on incorrect information about 
whether or not Bond was imprisoned was harmless.  It was appropriate for the Court to 
vacate the order appointing counsel.         
                                                                                                                                                             
and 1915A instruct a court to dismiss an IFP case “at any time if the court determines that 
. . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); id. § 1915A.  The Court fairly believed that Bond‟s claim was time-
barred, and, thus, did not err in dismissing the case without holding an evidentiary 
hearing on Bond‟s imprisonment status.  A court cannot be expected to guess at the 
reasons to apply a tolling doctrine when no facts in support of tolling have been provided 
by the claimant, even in pro se cases. 
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III. Conclusion 
We will affirm the order of the District Court.   
